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Abstract—Growing interest in utilizing the wireless spectrum
by heterogeneous devices compels us to rethink the physical layer
security to protect the transmitted waveform from an eavesdrop-
per. We propose an end-to-end symmetric key neural encryption
and decryption algorithm with a modulation technique, which
remains undeciphered by an eavesdropper, equipped with the
same neural network and trained on the same dataset as the
intended users. We solve encryption and modulation as a joint
problem for which we map the bits to complex analog signals,
without adhering to any particular encryption algorithm or
modulation technique. We train to cooperatively learn encryption
and decryption algorithms between our trusted pair of neural
networks, while eavesdropper’s model is trained adversarially
on the same data to minimize the error. We introduce a discrete
activation layer with a defined gradient to combat noise in a
lossy channel. Our results show that a trusted pair of users can
exchange data bits in both clean and noisy channels, where a
trained adversary cannot decipher the data.
I. INTRODUCTION
As new spectrum (sub-6GHz, mmWave and TeraHertz)
becomes available for communication and coexistence of
frequency-agile cognitive heterogeneous nodes becomes a
norm, we need to rethink physical layer security to provide
maximum secrecy of the waveforms in a broadcast channel.
Recent advances in the use of neural networks for commu-
nication systems intrigue us to investigate whether neural
networks can be trained to simultaneously learn an encryp-
tion/decryption algorithm as well as modulate/demodulate bits
to transmit and receive an analog signal. Neural networks
are applied to accomplish complex tasks with end-to-end
data based training in order to achieve a certain objective or
minimize a certain loss function. These tasks can be generating
images [1], learning complex distributions, classification [2] or
performing autonomous driving [3]. On the other hand, most
of the cryptography algorithm operates on bit manipulation,
whereas neural networks work on continuous signals. Instead
of combating these discrepancies between neural networks and
cryptography, we leverage the efficiency of neural network
in solving complex tasks and its capability of handling con-
tinuous signal to our advantage in bridging the gap between
cryptography and modulation. At the same time, we are
broadening the scope of cryptography beyond the bits domain
and mapping to a much larger complex domain. This ensures
that it becomes computationally more complex to decrypt
using Brute Force attacks. Although Physical layer security
research [4]–[7] takes advantage of the channel impairments
to modify the transmitted signal, it does not ensure a complete
optimized system that can take in bits and convert them to
secured waveforms.
Learning an encryption and decryption algorithm is beyond
just mapping of bits to another domain. To ensure secrecy and
integrity of information, it is important that an eavesdropper
(Eve) listening to the cipher data (communication between
Alice, the sender, and Bob, the receiver) will not be able
to decipher it without a key. Hence, we design Alice and
Bob to each have a neural network to learn the optimized
algorithm. This notion is same as the encryption and decryp-
tion algorithms are known is classical cryptography. It is only
possible to obtain higher levels of secrecy when we can also
emulate an adversary, a passive eavesdropper in our model, and
cooperatively train Alice and Bob to defeat Eve. Hence, we
introduce Eve as another neural network during the training
phase that is constantly trying to decipher the data and the
model is trained in an adversarial manner to converge to a
system, where Alice and Bob can defeat Eve. We also train Eve
on the same model and with the same plain text data as Alice
and Bob. This guarantees that the learned encryption algorithm
will be able to beat both a trained as well as untrained Eve with
same neural network structure as Alice and Bob. This paper
aims at combining the cryptography and modulation using
neural networks, which can be extended later to implement
physical layer security in OFDM and massive MIMO systems.
In this paper, three neural networks are trained simulta-
neously to learn a symmetric key based secured modulation
method in presence of a passive eavesdropper. The key con-
tributions of this work can be listed as follows:
1) We propose an end-to-end learning of shared key based
secured modulation technique, where bits are mapped to
real numbers and then converted to complex domain to be
transmitted over a channel.
2) We introduce a discrete activation layer with a defined
gradient, which is derived to support a practical lossy medium
communication system and finite memory devices. The activa-
tion function guarantees a gradient, when stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) [8] is applied during training.
3) We design our system so that it is able to adapt to both
clear and noisy channels to ensure that secured communication
can be carried out between trusted parties while a passive
eavesdropper is unable to decipher it.
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Fig. 1: Neural Network Architecture
II. RELATED WORK
Deep neural network has been used in physical layer com-
munication [9] to learn optimal constellation points without
prior mathematical formulation. Also, GANs [10] have been
used to train the autoencoder network for practical channel
models. In addition, autoencoders are used to learn advanced
communication schemes, such as orthogonal frequency divi-
sion multiplexing (OFDM), which enables reliable transmis-
sion in wireless channels [11] as well as optical media [12].
The idea of using adversarial neural network in cryptog-
raphy was introduced in [13]. However, the authors restrict
the model to work with floating point domain representation
between (-1,1). This assumption is not feasible since there
are infinite number of points inside this interval, which can
not be supported by low memory devices with limited bit
representation and can not be used for lossy media transmis-
sion. In [14], authors use a similar approach and reduces the
model complexity and the input/output representation in order
to force the model to achieve the XOR behavior between the
data and the key. Although the results show that Alice and Bob
can exchange confidential data successfully in less number
of training iterations, however the model can be classified
as semi linear, since it consists of only two fully connected
layer with a single activation function. Thus, the model is
imperfectly secured due to decreasing the encryption function.
Moreover, the ‘mix and transform’ architecture is absent due
to the absence of convolution layers in the model, which
makes the algorithm easy to be broken. In [15], the authors
used autoencoder model and train it in a wiretap channel
environment to achieve a key-less encryption between Alice
and Bob. However, this approach is SNR dependant as Eve
can decode the data if it has the same capability as Bob. The
results showed that Eve did not reach to the uncertainty and
was able to decode the confidential information partially as
the SNR increases.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The wiretap channel is an information-theoretic model for
communication in the presence of an eavesdropper, which
involves three nodes: sender (Alice), receiver (Bob) and
eavesdropper (Eve) as shown in figure 1. Alice encodes a
confidential message P using key, K, and outputs cipher
data C, which is transformed to complex representation and
transmitted as a complex vector X to Bob. Both Bob and Eve
receive the complex cipher vector Y , which is X after passing
through the channel. The real representation C ′ is recovered
from Y . Bob decodes C ′ using K to obtain PˆBob. However,
Eve uses only C ′ to obtain PˆEve which is Eve’s predicted
output for the confidential message P . In this work, symmetric
key encryption is considered where both Alice and Bob share
the same key (K). Alice, Bob and Eve are all neural networks
with parameters θA, θB and θE respectively. In this paper, we
investigate both clear and fading wiretap channels.
A. Clear wiretap channel
Clear wiretap channel is considered as a no loss transmis-
sion media. This type of encryption algorithm can be used
to represent data for secure storage, and hence is applicable
to confidential data storage in untrusted third party cloud. In
clear channel, if Alice transmits X , the received symbol for
both Bob and Eve is Y , which can be given by:
Y = X (1)
B. Gaussian wiretap channel
Gaussian wiretap channel is defined as the channel with
Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) for both Bob and
Eve. In other words, if Alice transmits X , the received symbol
for both Bob and Eve, Y , is given by:
Y = X +N (2)
where N ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the added complex noise vectors
and σ2 depends on the received signal to noise ratio (SNR).
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C. Rayleigh wiretap channel
Similar to Gaussian wiretap channel, Rayeligh wiretap
channel is defined as AWGN in nature, except the channel
gain is not unity. If Alice transmits X , the received symbol
for both Bob and Eve, Y , is given by:
Y = HX +N (3)
where H is the channel matrix between the transmitter and the
receiver. In this work, we only consider flat fading channels,
so H is a diagonal matrix and the diagonal elements have a
unity mean with Rayleigh distribution.
D. Data and Key
Range and Domain: Neural Network of Alice is designed
to accept P and K in bits. In other words P,K ∈ B where
B = {0, 1}, while the cipher data C ∈ R, where R is the set
of real numbers. For practical implementation, we constrain C
within the range (−1, 1). Bob’s network is designed to accept
C ′ as well as K and outputs PˆBob ∈ R. Similar to Bob, Eve
accepts C ′ and outputs PˆEve ∈ R. We restrict PˆBob and PˆEve
in the range between (0, 1). At the end of a successful training
process, the values of PˆBob should converge to B, while PˆEve
should not. PˆBob and PˆEve are converted from R to B to
extract the output bits.
Length: The length of the data and key are essential param-
eters for data security. This is because the security introduced
by the encryption algorithm depends on the length of the data
as well as the key. According to Shannon secrecy [16], the
system can be perfectly secure if the key size equals to the
data size such that:
lim
NK→NP
I(C,P ) = 0 (4)
where I(C,P ) is the mutual information between cipher
data and plain data, and NP and NK are the lengths of
the plain data and the key respectively. Thus, one-time pad
encryption [17] is information-theoretic secure because the
lengths of the data and the key are equal. In this work, we have
trained the network on a finite set of keys (i.e NK < NP ) such
that the networks are not restricted to learn only one-time pad
encryption. The scope of this paper is limited to single carrier
communication but we have designed the system parameters in
a way that it can be easily adapted to OFDM systems. Hence,
the block sizes of K, P and C equal to N , where N is double
the size of the FFT. The search space of the cipher symbol
S(C) can be given by:
S(C) = 2N (5)
This indicates that larger the size of the FFT, the search space
that it might get mapped to increases, which increases the
secrecy capacity for C. This property is enhanced as we move
from bit-level modifications in traditional higher layer security
to real number domain with C ∈ R.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we define the objective of each member
of the network. Alice and Bob try to exchange confidential
information in a secure way such that Eve can not recover
plain data P from the cipher data C ′. On the other side,
Eve tries to reconstruct P from C ′, which can be achieved
by reducing the error between PˆEve and P . Informally, the
objective of Alice and Bob is to figure out a secure way to
exchange the confidential data as well as defeat Eve to recover
any information from the shared cipher text. Based on these
objectives, the three neural networks should be trained in an
adversarial manner. The loss functions for both Alice and Bob,
as well as Eve, have to be derived to support the adversarial
behavior of Eve.
We define A(θA, P,K), B(θB , C,K) and E(θE , C) as the
output vectors of Alice, Bob and Eve respectively. In addition
d(P, Pˆ ) =
√∑N
i=1(Pi − Pˆi)2 (i.e d(P, Pˆ ) is the L2 norm in
case of vectors and Frobenius Norm in case of matrices).
Intuitively, the loss function of Eve is derived as:
LE(θA, θE , P,K) = EP,K(d(P, PˆEve) =
EP,K(d(P,E(θE , A(θA,K, P )))) (6)
It is to be noted here that we train Eve on the same plain data
P as Alice and Bob to minimize the loss function. Similarly,
the loss function of Bob is derived as:
LB(θA, θB , P,K) = EP,K(d(P, PˆBob))
= EP,K(d(B(A(θA,K, P ),K, θB)), P ) (7)
From 7, it is inferred that Bob’s Loss function depends on
the cipher data and the shared key as well; however, this is
not sufficient to train the network in an adversarial manner.
Thus, the adversarial Loss function of Bob should minimize
the error between PˆBob and P as well as maximize the error
between PˆEve and P . This problem is similar to min-max
optimization in GAN [10]. In order to derive this, we have
to optimize a joint loss function between Alice and Bob to
update their parameters simultaneously and is given by:
LA,B(θA, θB) = argminθA,θB (LB(θA, θB , P,K)
− LE(θA, θE , P,K)) (8)
From (6) and (8), it is inferred that both of them depend
on θA. However, cooperative learning happens only between
Alice and Bob to defeat Eve. So during the training phase,
θA only gets updated jointly with Bob, and they are frozen
during the training of Eve in each epoch. According to the
definition of entropy [18], the receiver reaches the maximum
uncertainty, if the received value of Eve equals to 0.5. Once
that is reached, random guessing is the only way for Eve
to recover the transmitted bits. Accordingly, the uncertainty
property has to be added to equation (8), such that both Alice
and Bob can try to figure out a transmission pattern that
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satisfies the maximum uncertainty to Eve. Thus equation(8)
can be reformulated as:
LA,B(θA, θB) = argminθA,θB (LB(θA, θB , P,K)
+ (0.5− LEN (θA, θE , P,K))2) (9)
where LEN is the normalized loss function of Eve. As shown
in (9), the first component tends to minimize the error between
Alice and Bob, while the later one enforces the mean loss of
Eve to be 0.5. Thus the received values take the value of 0.5,
which increases the uncertainty at Eve’s side. Recall that we
use hard decision decoding to convert the received data values
to data bits.
V. NEURAL NETWORK DESIGN
A. Neural network structure
Figure 1 shows the neural network architecture used by
the three entities in the system. Alice accepts P and K
representing plaintext and key respectively. Bob accepts K
and C ′, which is the cipher text signal after passing through
the channel. Eve’s input is only C ′. The output of Alice is
the cipher data C, whereas the output of Bob and Eve are
PˆBob and PˆEve denoting the predicted P for Bob and Eve
respectively. All the input and output parameters, P , K, C,
C ′, PˆBob and PˆEve are vectors of dimension N . We utilize
a ‘mix and transform’ architecture to build the three neural
networks. The network starts with fully connected layers (FC)
without any activation function being introduced. The purpose
of this layer is mixing the key and the data bits so that the
output bits are permuted input bits or a mix between data
and key bits. The network consists of multiple convolutional
layers to enable squeezing data and key bits. The convolutional
layer is described as conv(W,din, dout, s), where W is the
window size, din is the input depth, dout is the output depth
and s is the stride. The stride is defined as the number of steps
the window is shifted. In general, the convolutional layers are
used to extract the features in image classification by neural
networks. Thus, in cryptography applications, convolutional
layers are used to extract the common features between the
data and the key. For Alice, sigmoid activation function is
used after each convolutional layer which is given by:
σ(z) =
1
1 + e−z
(10)
while the final layer, tanh activation function is used to
make the transmitted data a bipolar form. tanh output ranges
between (-1,1) and is given by:
tanh(x) =
ex − e−x
ex + e−x
(11)
On the other hand, we use Relu activation function [19] at the
first layers for Bob and Eve to compensate the channel effect
in the forward path and increase the learning propagation to
Alice layers. Sigmoid activation function has been used so that
the output converges between (0,1) to make the output vectors
achieve the bit values at the end of the training process. A hard
decision decoding is performed to transform PˆBob and PˆEve
from R to B.
B. Discrete activation function
Most of the neural network (NN) training algorithms are
based on gradient descent methods. This has moved all the
research related to the NN to use floating point number
representation and smooth activation functions to guarantee
the existing gradient values to the NN parameters to achieve
the cost function convergence during the training [20]. This is
because the updated NN weights during training is given by:
wk+1i = w
k
i − 
∂J
∂wi
(12)
where wi is the NN weight,  is the learning rate, k is the
training epoch and ∂J∂wi is the partial derivative of the cost
function J with respect to the NN weight wi.
As shown in (2) and (3), the added corruption in noisy
lossy channel is considered as a continuous random variable.
Hence, X has to be at a discrete level to eliminate the added
corruption at the receiver. In other words, the receiver will
not be able to compensate the channel effect if the minimum
distance between the transmitted constellation points is too
small. In addition, floating point representation is impractical
for limited memory applications. On the other hand, adding
discrete layers in the neural networks causes error in back
propagation, since the gradient of any discrete function is
undefined. Consequently, the total gradient of the network will
vanish, and the cost function will not converge. In this work,
we define a discrete tanh function (i.e. y = tanhD(x)) to be
used to quantify the output of Alice NN into defined levels as
shown in Algorithm (1). In order to use tanhD(x) with the
regular gradient methods, we define a suitable derivative to be
used in the backward path, which is given by:
∂(tanhD(x))
∂x
= 1.0− tanh2 (x) (13)
In this work, we do not perform the quantization on the
input of the activation function. Thus, the output of the
last convolutional layer can take any value in the tanhD(x)
domain (i.e. the firing region of the activation function),
which enables the gradients to propagate to the earlier layers
during the training process. Figure 2 shows the continuous and
discrete tanh functions used for clear and Gaussian wiretap
channels respectively. As the number of levels increases, the
behavior of tanhD(x) tends to be similar to tanh(x). Thus
it is not feasible to use tanhD(x) with a higher number of
levels in transmission over lossy media. On the other hand,
if the number of levels decreases, the back propagation error
increases, which leads to exploding gradient problem [21].
In this work, we trained the system on various values of the
number of levels L to find the optimal number of levels L∗.
C. Modulate and Demodulate
The NN supports real numbers only; however this repre-
sentation is not efficient for carrier transmission as we are not
utilizing the real and imaginary domains. In this work, we
convert the real representation of the transmitted symbol C
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Algorithm 1: yq = tanhD(x, levels).
Result: yq
y = tanh(x);
ymin = −1;
ymax = 1;
step = (ymax − ymin)/(levels− 1);
yq = b(y − ymin)/step+ 0.5c ∗ step+ ymin
(a) Continuous tanh. (b) Discrete tanh with 13 levels.
Fig. 2: Continuous and discrete tanh activation functions.
to complex transmitted symbol X to support single or multi-
carrier transmission. Each complex sample x in the complex
vector X can be given by:
xm = ci + jci+1 (14)
where ci is the ith real sample in C, m takes values form
1 to dN2 e and i ranges from 1 to N . At the receiver side
(i.e. either Bob or Eve), the reverse operation takes place,
such that Y is changed to C ′ at the NN input. The result
of modulation is represented by the cipher data constellation,
as shown in figure 3 with both tanh and tanhD functions.
With clear channel, the signal can take any real value, which
shows the Gaussian distribution of the constellation. In the
presence of noise, as we introduce discrete steps, the resultant
constellation takes the form of QAM signal.
D. Parameter initialization
In this work, we use Xavier initialization [22] to initialize
the total weights and biases. This initialization is used to
accelerate the convergence of the neural networks and avoid
gradient saturation. Moreover, we did not restrict the network
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
(a) tanh function followed by
modulation in clear wiretap
channel.
(b) Discrete tanh function fol-
lowed by modulation in Gaus-
sian and Rayleigh wiretap chan-
nels.
Fig. 3: Cipher data constellation X .
to learn a defined function such as XOR; however, we leave
the network to learn the secured modulation waveform such
that it minimizes the cooperative learning loss function.
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
We implemented our experiments in TensorFlow [23]. In
our experiments, we choose N = 96 such that N is double
the number of the transmitted data subcarriers (48) in 64-
pt FFT implementation of Wi-Fi standard [24]. During the
training phase, both the plain data and the key are random
numbers generated from two different seeds, such that every
block consists of different data and key combination. The
training data size consists of 20, 000 symbols each with size
N . The key to data ratio used to train the system is 0.005.
In other words, the same set of keys were repeated during
the training process to ensure that the algorithm is robust
and is not restricted to one-time pad only. The batch size
is 8000. We used Adam optimizer [25] with a learning rate
of 0.001. The number of training epoch is 4000 for clear
wiretap channel, 7000 for Gaussian wiretap channel and 8000
for Rayleigh wiretap channel. The three networks are trained
simultaneously in each epoch such that, the weights of Eve’s
network are frozen while Alice and Bob update their weights
and biases based on the cooperative loss function, then the
weights of Alice and Bob are frozen and Eve updates her
network with the updated weights and biases based on her
loss function. In this work, we choose the number of discrete
levels L = 13 for tanhD(x) activation function in Gaussian
and Rayleigh channels. For testing phase, we use a testing
data set consisting of 1000 symbols, each of size N . The same
key to data ratio is used in testing phase as well. However,
the seeds used for data and key generation are different from
those used in the training phase. For Gaussian and Rayleigh
channels, the SNR range used for testing is from 0 to 40dB.
We trained and tested the system in clear as well as AWGN
and Rayleigh channels.
A. Training Phase
1) Clear wiretap channel: Figure 4 presents the results
during the training phase in clear wiretap channel. Loss
functions of both the networks started from a high value, as
shown in figure 4a. After some time, Alice and Bob succeeded
to infer a way to communicate securely, while Eve can not
decode the confidential data. Thus the cooperative learning
between Alice and Bob succeeds in beating Eve such that they
can exchange the data with perfect secrecy. As a result of that,
the transmitted cipher data distribution (C) has the shape of
Gaussian distribution with zero mean as shown in figure 4b.
Thus the cipher data C do not carry any statistical properties
of the original plain data P . Hence the cipher data has the
maximum uncertainty property. We plot the data distribution
of PˆBob and PˆEve in figures 4c and 4d respectively. Within that
distribution, we also differentiate the data points as decoded
correctly or incorrectly. It is evident that distribution of PˆBob is
not only similar to the distribution of P , but also the decoded
bits are correct. On the other hand, the distribution of PˆEve is
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Fig. 4: Loss function and data distribution for different entities with tanh function in the last layer.
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Fig. 5: Loss function and data distribution for different nodes with Discrete tanh function in Gaussian wiretap channel.
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Fig. 6: Loss function and data distribution for different nodes with Discrete tanh function in Rayleigh wiretap channel.
Gaussian, yielding half of the bits in error. Hence, Eve reaches
to the maximum uncertainty as the probability of error reaches
the value of 0.5.
2) Gaussian wiretap channel: In this section, the results
of using the discrete activation layer are discussed using the
Gaussian wiretap channel and shown in figure 5. The number
of levels chosen for the tanhD function is 13 and the training
SNR is set at 25 dB. The loss functions, as shown in figure 5a,
are similar to that noticed in clear channel. It required more
number of epochs to train the two systems as there is added
noise in the channel and C has discrete levels, as in figure 5b.
Furthermore, Eve’s final loss function is lower in Gaussian
channel than clear channel as the output is discretized partially
sacrificing maximum uncertainty. PˆBob has only 1s and 0s
and decodes all the bits correctly as well, as in figure 5c. In
contrast, PˆEve has an almost uniform distribution, with higher
peaks around 0 and 1, as in figure 5d. This leads to 20% of
PˆEve in error, which still maintains a certain level of security.
3) Rayleigh wiretap channel: In this section, we analyze
the training phase of the system using the Rayleigh wiretap
channel, as shown in figure 6. The training SNR and number
of levels have been chosen to be same as the Gaussian wiretap
channel. The loss function curves, as in figure 6a, are similar
to that of Gaussian channel, indicating that Alice and Bob
succeeded in secure exchange confidential data, whereas, Eve
reaches the uncertainty zone. As we introduce more noise in
the channel, the cipher distribution, C, deviates from Gaussian
distribution as noticed in earlier scenarios. PˆBob decodes all
the bits correctly, as in figure 6c. On the other hand, PˆEve has
an almost uniform distribution as noticed in figure 6d, which is
similar to that in Gaussian channel. This yields 16% of PˆEve
in errorin the training phase.
B. Testing Phase
Once the complete system is trained, we test the resultant
networks and analyze the bit error rate (BER) in different
channels, as shown in figure 7. The source of error in BER
can be of two types: a) channel imperfections as in traditional
communication and b) decryption algorithm, which was unable
to recover all the bits correctly. We define ‘Hard Decision Eve’
as the entity, which makes a hard decision on the received
cipher data (C ′) to map to a bit value. In clear channel,
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(a) Clear wiretap channel.
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Bob Rayleigh
Eve Rayleigh
(b) Noisy wiretap channels.
Fig. 7: BER for Clear, Gaussian and Rayleigh channels.
C ′ = C, where the BER of ‘Hard Decision Eve’ indicates the
cross-entropy between P and C (i.e., H(P/C)). Similarly, the
BER of trained Eve is a measure of cross-entropy between P
and PˆEve (i.e., H(P/PˆEve)).
In clear channel, Bob can decode both training and testing
dataset correctly, as shown in figure 7a. The BER of ‘Hard
Decision Eve’ is ≈ 0.5, indicating encryption algorithm
achieved the maximum value of H(P/C). Trained Eve’s BER
is ≈ 0.4, which is close to the maximum value of H(P/PˆEve),
which is equivalent to random guessing. Figure 7b shows the
BER of trained Bob and Eve in noisy wiretap channels. Alice
and Bob can securely exchange the data with a small error rate,
which depends on the received SNR. On the other hand, Eve’s
BER remains steady at 0.2 even at higher SNRs. Hence the
learned encryption does not depend on Eve’s SNR to maintain
a higher value for H(P/PˆEve).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that the power of neural
networks can be used to learn end-to-end encrypted com-
munication system. To improve the security of the learned
encryption algorithm, we train the system in presence of
an adversary to minimize the error between Alice and Bob,
while maximizing the error between Alice and Eve. A discrete
activation function is defined for the final modulated output to
support lossy medium transmission. Our results indicate that
a secured communication can be executed in presence of a
trained or untrained Eve with the same neural network model
as the trusted parties. In future, we plan to extend this work
for OFDM systems and channel coding in massive MIMO
wireless networks.
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